What are the prices of random variables? In this paper, we define the least-squares prices of coin-flipping games, which are proved to be minimal, positive linear, and arbitrage-free. These prices depend both on a set of games that are available for investing simultaneously and on a risk-free interest rate. In addition, we show a case where the mean-variance portfolio theory is inappropriate.
Introduction
Consider the following two coin-flipping games: [Game A] Profit is 19 or 1 if a tossed coin yields heads or tails, respectively.
[Game B] Profit is 10 if a tossed coin yields heads or tails.
In general, game B is preferable to game A (see [7, Example 9.2] ). Despite the fact that the expectations concerning the two games are equal, the price of B should be higher than that of A. However, if game C is available for investing simultaneously, the three prices of these games should be the same; this is because the mixed game (A + C)/2 is equal to B.
[Game C] Profit is 1 or 19 if a tossed coin yields heads or tails, respectively. Therefore, the price of a game should change in accordance with the set of games that are available for investing simultaneously. As F. Black and M. Scholes demonstrate, the price of an option depends on the risk-free continuously compound interest rate r > 0 (see [1, page 643] ). It is noteworthy that if r = 0, no investor will invest his/her money, because no gain is expected. In this paper (except in Remarks 3.5 and 3.6), we assume that r is 0.05. The term "arbitrage-free" implies that no investor has an opportunity to earn a profit exceeding the risk-free interest rate.
Here, we introduce the pricing method of a coin-flipping game.
Theorem 1.1. Suppose that a game A := (a, b) involves a profit a or b (a, b > 0) if a tossed coin yields heads or tails, respectively. Put
, then the price of game A is given by u A r = √ ab/e r , and the optimal proportion of investment is 1. Otherwise, u
, where κ := (1 − 1 − 1/e 2r )/2, and the optimal proportion of investment is u
Proof . Using Remark 3.1 under the conditions of this theorem and solving the simultaneous quadratic equations, we obtain the conclusion.
1.051 and κ 0.3458, we obtain the price u A r 7.224 and the optimal proportion of investment t u A r 0.274. Now, we explain the term "optimal proportion of investment." Let t ∈ [0, 1] be a proportion of investment; then, the investor repeatedly invests t of his/her current capital. For example, let c be the current capital; when the investor plays game A = (19, 1) once, his/her capital will be 19ct/u+c(1−t) or ct/u+c(1−t) if a tossed coin yields heads or tails, respectively, where u is the price of the game. Let the initial capital be 1. After N attempts, if the investor has capital c N , then the growth rate (geometric mean) is given by c 1.051, we obtain the price u B r 9.512. In this case, the optimal proportion of investment is 1. This implies that the investor should invest his/her entire current capital in each attempt.
In Section 2, we will introduce the least-squares price u 
< E
A /e r for each A ∈ Ω.
Least-squares prices
.., m} be a finite set of coin-flipping games, which are completely correlated. Denote the convex cone 
From Theorem 1.1, we can verify that 0 < u 
we have L((0)) = sup (pi)∈Q (u
piAi /e r ≤ 1.
Since the set T := {(t i ) ∈ S : L((t i )) ≤ 1} is not null, convex, closed, and thus compact, there is a unique point (
Ai r ) and call it the least-squares price of A i in Ω for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each mixed game
Ai /e r and u
Proof. By the above assumption, we obtain L((0)) = 1 and v = 0, which implies the conclusion.
Theorem 2.4. The system of least-squares prices is arbitrage-free, and there is a mixed game that earns profit equal to the growth rate of e r .
Proof. As T ⊂ S and Q are compact, and u P n i=1 piAi r is continuous with respect to (p i ) ∈ Q (see Theorem 1.1), (x i ) ∈ T and (q i ) ∈ Q exist such that
This shows that the mixed game n i=1 q i A i earns profit that is equal to the growth rate of e r . On the other hand, for each nonzero mixed game
. Therefore, the game n i=1 k i A i earns profit that is equal to or less than the growth rate of e r .
Theorem 2.5. The system of least-squares prices is minimal in order to be arbitrage-free. Proof. We prove this by using reduction to absurdity. Assuming that a set of prices
for some k. If R j < u Aj r for some j, then the game A j earns profit exceeding the growth rate of e r . Thus, we can assume that u Aj /e r . It is easy to verify that s i ≤ x i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and s k < x k . From the above statement, we have
and thus
, that is, the mixed game n i=1 q i A i earns profit exceeding the growth rate of e r .
It is not difficult to verify that if Ω = {A i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and Ω ′ = {B j : 
Remarks
Remark 3.1. Consider a random variable X with nonnegative bounded profit a(x) and distribution dF (x). In the case where exp( log a(x)dF (x))/e r ≤ 1/ 1/a(x)dF (x), the price is given by u X r = exp( log a(x)dF (x))/e r , and the optimal proportion of investment is 1. Otherwise, the price u = u X r and the optimal proportion of investment t are determined by the simultaneous equations exp( log(a(x)t/u−t+1) dF (x)) = e r and (a(x) − u)/(a(x)t −ut + u)dF (x) = 0 (see [3, Corollaries 5.1, 5.3, and Section 6]).
Remark 3.2. Remark 3.1 can be generalized to the nonnegative unbounded case where a(x)>1 a(x) ν dF < ∞ for some ν > 0. For example, because
Petersburg game {profit 2 j with probability 1/2 j , j = 1, 2, ...} is priced at 4.816 with the optimal proportion of investment 0.204. Remark 3.3. In Section 2, the value of n is 1 or 2. However, when the reader challenges to study dice games, the value of n may be 36. To generalize this theory to the convex cone Ψ with a finite basis Ω, we need the fact that u 
